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Abstract
This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology
can discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a
simple menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to maximize total welfare, and agents
choose among the menu. This mechanism is immune to deviations by single agents, and to
deviations by groups of agents of sizes 2, 3 and 4 if side-payments are ruled out. However, if
compensations are allowed, groups of agents may have an incentive to jointly deviate from the
optimal contract in order to exploit other agents. We identify network topologies for which the
optimal contract is group incentive compatible with transfers: undirected networks and regular
oriented trees, and network topologies for which the planner must assign uniform quantities:
single root and nested neighborhoods directed networks.
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1 Introduction
For privacy and security reasons, individual data are often anonymized before they can be shared
or sold to third parties. As is known from the statistical and computer science literature, privacy-
preserving data disclosure can be achieved in multiple ways, from a complete elimination of any
identification of the individual (anonymization) to algorithmic and statistical methods to avoid
identification (differential privacy). The recent advances in privacy protection, together with the
fast development of data sharing and data disclosure raises the following question: How valuable
are anonymized data (rather than full individual data) for a third party whose objective is not
aligned with the welfare of individuals? When will the third party be able to achieve the same
value with anonymized data and with the full, individual data?
We answer this question in the specific context of social network data. In that context, anonymized
data describe the network topology, the architecture of the network without specifying the identity of
agents at different nodes. For example, anonymized social network data can be geo-data describing
a network of roads and houses with no specification of the inhabitants, or an organizational chart
for a company or a criminal organization with no identification of the individuals, or a snapshot of
a fraction of a large digital social network (Twitter, LinkedIn or Facebook) with lacunary evidence
on the identity of the nodes.
We suppose that the social network describes local positive externalities in the choices of agents,
and consider a third party whose objective is to maximize total surplus. The third party could be a
monopolist, selecting discriminatory prices to exploit local consumption externalities (by lowering
the price to stimulate consumption of individuals generating important externalities), or a firm
who wishes to maximize output, when the social networks describes synergies in efforts by pairs
of workers. In the presence of local network externalities, the objective of the planner and of
individuals are not aligned: the planner internalizes positive externalities that an agent produces
on other agents, raising consumption (in the case of the monopolist) or effort (in the case of the
firm) beyond the optimum of individuals.
When full individual data are available, the planner can target agents and offer them the exact
contract which maximizes her objective. But when the planner only knows the network topology,
she is only able to offer a contract for each location in the network, with no certainty that agents
will indeed choose the contract corresponding to that location. This is the incentive problem we
study in this paper, where we analyze for which network architectures this incentive constraint is
binding or not.
We first observe, unsurprisingly, that correlation in the locations of agents allows the planner
to achieve his first-best outcome when agents can only make unilateral deviations. Indeed, because
the set of locations in the network is fixed and finite, if the planner proposes a menu of contracts,
one for each location, and all other agents pick the contract corresponding to their location, the
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deviating agent must be selecting the same contract as another agent. The planner can use this
evidence to ascertain that one of the agents has lied, and punish all agents (for example by offering
a level lower than any agent’s optimum) as in Cre´mer and McLean [7], thereby ensuring that all
agents have an incentive to choose the contract corresponding to their true location.1
We thus turn our attention to joint deviations, where subsets of agents decide to “lie” about
their locations, and choose contracts which do not correspond to their true position in the network.
Given that the objective of the planner is to maximize social surplus, why do groups of agents
have an incentive to lie about their locations and exchange their contracts? Why would an agent
who already receives a consumption or effort level above his optimal choice accept to exchange his
contract with another agent with a higher level? The answer to these questions stems from the fact
that, by exchanging their contracts, agents are able to increase the externalities they receive from
other agents, while reducing the externalities they create for agents outside the deviating coalition.
For example, consider a directed network architecture where the hub of the star (the “influencer”)
produces positive consumption externalities on all other agents but receives no externalities in
return. The planner, internalizing this externality, assigns a very high consumption to the hub, and
a lower consumption to a peripheral agents. But the hub may have an incentive to exchange his
contract with a peripheral agent, increasing his utility by reducing his consumption level, at the
expense of all other peripheral agents, who now receive a much lower level of externalities.
The first main Proposition of the paper asserts that, when the size of the deviating group is two,
three or four, the optimal contract is in fact immune to deviations by groups of agents. The proof
of the Proposition in the case of pairwise deviations is clear. For an agent to accept to exchange his
contract for a higher one (e.g. for a peripheral agent to accept the high level of the hub), whereas
his current contract is already too high given the contracts of other agents, he must receive higher
externalities in return from the members of the deviating coalition. But when a pair of agents
deviates, the externalities inside the deviating coalition do not change, as agents only exchange
their contracts and externalities are suppose to be symmetric. Hence, in any pairwise deviation,
absent any compensation, the agent with the lower contract must be unwilling to exchange his
contract with the other agent.2
Based on this observation, we consider a more restrictive group incentive compatibility condition,
by allowing agents in the deviating coalition to make side-payments. Under this condition, a
contract is group incentive compatible if no coalition, by choosing a permutation of the locations,
can increase the sum of utilities of its members. In the particular context of a linear-quadratic
1As usual, this reasoning only shows that truth-telling is one equilibrium of the revelation game played by the
agents, but other equilibria exist as well – in fact, in this model, any choice of contracts by the agents is an equilibrium
of the game.
2Unfortunately, this intuition does not easily carry over to deviations by larger groups, where agents can benefit
from a change in the level of externalities among agents in the deviating coalition. For groups of three and four
agents, we are able to prove that one of the lower contract agents must be unwilling to exchange, but so far have
been unable to generalize the result beyond groups of four agents.
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game, we show that this condition is equivalent to assuming that, whenever an agent i has a higher
contract than an agent j, the sum of externalities received by agent i must be at least as large as
the sum of externalities received by agent j.
This characterization drives the second main result of the paper. When externalities are recip-
rocal (the graph representing the social network is undirected), then the optimal contract of the
planner is immune to group deviations with transfers. The intuition underlying this result is that
an agent will receive a higher contract in the first-best if and only if he is more central (in the sense
of Katz-Bonacich) than the other agent. But this centrality measure is defined recursively: an agent
has a higher Katz-Bonacich centrality if and only if the sum of the Katz-Bonacich centralities of his
neighbors is higher. In other words, when influence is reciprocal, an agent with a higher contract
in the first-best is also an agent who receives (and produces) higher externalities, and the sum of
utilities of the agents cannot increase through an exchange of contracts.
The situation changes dramatically when externalities are asymmetric. We next focus on di-
rected networks with a hierarchical structure: the set of agents can be partitioned into an ordered
collection of subsets (or tiers of the hierarchy) such that agents at higher tiers influence agents
at lower tiers, but agents at lower tiers never influence agents at higher tiers. In this family of
hierarchical social networks, we first show that the optimal contract is group incentive compatible
when side-payments are ruled out. But when agents in a deviating coalition can make transfers, we
uncover two situations where the optimal contract of the planner cannot be sustained.
First, when there exists one agent who influences all other agents the single root and the number
of tiers is larger than two, then in an optimal contract which is immune to group deviations with
transfers, all agents in tiers lower than two must receive the same contract as the root. The intuition
is as follows: if the root receives a higher contract than agents at lower tiers, there is an incentive
to exchange the higher quantity of the root with the lower quantity of the lower tier agent, as the
latter receives externalities but not the former. Hence, any contract which is immune to deviations
by groups with transfers must assign a lower contract to the root than to agents at tiers lower than
two.3 However, as the root produces externalities on all other agents, whereas other agents may
not influence or be influenced by all other agents, the planner also has an incentive to increase the
contract of the root with respect to the contract of any other agent. Hence, at the optimum, the
contract of the root must be exactly equal to the contract offered to all agents at tiers lower than
two. Notice that this implies that targeting is impossible, and may result in large efficiency losses
with respect to the first-best.
Second, suppose that neighborhoods are nested, so that an agent at a lower tier is influenced
by all agents who also influence agents who influence him. Multiple roots can exist, and agents
can be connected to multiple roots, but the structure of nested neighborhoods implies that the set
3For agents at tier two, the only externalities they receive come from the root, and hence there is no restriction
on the relative ranking of their contract with the contract of the root.
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of influencers of an agent is included in the set of influencers of the agent he influences. Assume
furthermore that the size of the tiers is increasing: there are strictly more agents at lower tiers.
In this hierarchical structure, as in the case of single roots, we show that the optimal contract is
not group incentive compatible with transfers, and that any root has an incentive to exchange his
contract with an agent at lower tier. As in the case of a single root, the planner would like to
increase the quantity of the root, so that the optimal contract which is group incentive compatible
with transfers results in a uniform contract for all agents.4 Again, the group incentive compatibility
constraint is binding, and induces a total inability to discriminate among agents.
Finally, we consider a hierarchical structure where the optimal contract is immune to deviations
by coalitions making side payments: regular oriented tree. In these structures, every agent is
influenced by a single other agent (the social network is an oriented tree). Furthermore, the number
of agents influenced by an agent at any given tier is identical across agents of the same tier,
and strictly decreasing with the tier (this is what we call a “regular” oriented tree). In that
specific hierarchy, agents at higher tier must have a higher contract than the agents they influence,
because every agent they influence receives his externalities from his immediate predecessor, but the
predecessor receives externalities from other agents). When the structure is regular, the planner will
also want agents at higher levels of the hierarchy to receive higher contracts, so that the first-best
contract is indeed group incentive compatible with transfers.
Our results thus show that the optimal contract of the planner is immune to deviations by
groups whenever influence is reciprocal, or agents at higher levels of the hierarchy receive more
influence than agents at lower levels of the hierarchy. When on the other hand agents at higher
levels of the hierarchy produce more influence but receive less influence than agents at lower tiers,
the first-best contract is susceptible to group deviations, and the planner may in extreme cases be
forced to assign a uniform contract to all agents. These results thus show how the architecture of
the network matters to determine whether anonymized data are sufficient or not for the planner to
implement the first-best.
We also explore the robustness of our results with respect to the assumptions made in the
model. First, we note that we put a very strong restriction on the structure of deviating coalitions
by assuming that they are adjacent (i.e. any pair of agents in the deviating coalition must be
connected by a link). Absent this restriction, more coalitions can deviate and in fact, even in
the case of undirected networks and regular oriented trees, the first-best contract may become
impossible to implement.
Second, we analyze the effect of increasing the complexity of the contract, by allowing the
planner to extract information about agents’ local neighborhood. We show that if the planner can
collect information about an agent’s neighbors’ identity, the first-best contract becomes immune
4This time, under the assumption that agents at tier two are influenced by more than one root, they receive more
externalities than a root, and hence the reasoning which implies that an agent must receive a higher contract than
the root in a group incentive compatible contract with transfers also holds for tier two agents.
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to group deviations with transfers. Finally, we explore what happens when the planner knows the
identity of some agents in the network. For example, suppose that the network knows the identity
of the main influencers (the roots of the directed social network). We show through an example
that this partial information may greatly help the planner and allow him to discriminate much
more effectively among the agents.
Related literature. Our paper is related to the study of targeting in social networks, as surveyed
in Bloch [3]. The linear-quadratic model of interaction in networks we consider was introduced
in Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou [2]. General problems of targeting where the planner
seeks to maximize social welfare in the presence of complementarities have been recently studied
by Demange [8] and Galeotti, Golub and Goyal [10].
The problem of a monopolist pricing in the presence of local consumption externalities has
first been studied by Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [6] and Bloch and Que´rou [4]. Candogan,
Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [6] and Bloch and Que´rou [4] both look at the relation between the centrality
of consumers in a given network and the prices and quantities they are offered by a monopolist; in
the context of perfect knowledge of the network structure. They both show that when the network
is undirected - that is two directly connected consumers influence each other equally - consumers
are offered quantities proportional to their Bonacich centrality for the same price. Fainmesser and
Galeotti [9] consider a monopolist which can price discriminate based on her knowledge of either
the in-degrees of consumers (their influence), the out-degree of consumers (their susceptibility to
influence) or both. They show that the knowledge of in-degree (respectively out-degree) is more
valuable when the dispersion in in-degrees (respectively out-degree) in the network is higher.
A handful of recent papers extend the analysis of monopoly pricing and targeting to situations
of incomplete information. Jadbabaie and Kakhbod [11] consider the pricing problem when the
strength of influence among agents is private information. Ata, Belloni and Candogan [1], take a
different approach and assume that there is a seller who faces two groups of agents: observable and
latent. There are local consumption externalities among members of the same group and across
groups. The seller can observe past purchasing decisions only of the group of observable agents and
can try to deduce from these observations information on influence patterns. Finally, in a paper
which shares our motivation about the planner’s incentives to elicit information about the network,
Shi and Xing [13] consider a model where buyers draw their in and out-degrees independently from a
common distribution. They characterize the optimal contracts in the framework of random graphs.
The novelty in our model is to introduce incomplete information with regard to the network itself
by assuming that the structure is observable but the locations or identities of agents is private
information.
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2 The model
2.1 Agents, utilities and network effects
We consider a set N of agents (labeled “he”), indexed by i = 1, 2, .., n. Agents are connected in a
social network, which we represent by a graph g, with nodes i = 1, 2, ..n and edges gij ∈ {0, 1}. We
denote by G the adjacency matrix of the graph g.
Each agent i chooses an action xi ∈ ℜ+, which will be interpreted as his consumption or effort.
The utility of agent i depends on his action and the actions of his neighbors in the social network.
Following a well-established model, initiated by Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou [2], we assume
that utilities are quadratic, so that
Ui = aixi −
bi
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj .
For the main part of the analysis, we assume that all agents are identical, except for their
location in the social network. For homogeneous agents, ai = a and we normalize bi = b = 1 so
that
Ui = axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj .
2.2 The planner’s first-best
We consider a planner (labeled “she”) with perfect knowledge of the network g who chooses the
vector of actions x = (x1, ..xn) in order to maximize the sum of utilities of the agents,
V =
∑
i
Ui =
∑
i
axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j
gijxixj . (1)
The first-order conditions result in a system of linear equations:
a− xi + α
∑
j∈N
(gij + gji)xj = 0,
or in matrix terms, letting 1 denote the vector (1, ..., n), 0 the vector (0, .., 0) and I the identity
matrix
a1− Ix+ α(G+GT )x = 0.
Let λ denote the largest eigenvalue of the matrix (G + GT ).5 Following Ballester, Calvo-
5Because the matrix (G + GT ) is symmetric, all its eigenvalues are real and hence the largest eigenvalue is
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Armengol and Zenou [2] we compute the optimal solution of the planner’s problem as the solution
to the system of linear equations when external effects are not too large,
Proposition 1 If 1 > αλ the optimal solution of the planner ’s problem is given by
x∗ = (I− α(G+GT ))−1a1.
Next recall that the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure (Katz [12] and Bonacich [5]) of an agent
in the network with g with discount factor δ, β(G, δ) is the discounted sum of walks originating
from that agent,
β(G, δ) =
∞∑
k=0
δkGk1,
= (I− δG)−11.
It is easy to check that , the planner’s solution is to assign to each agent i an action which
is proportional to its Katz-Bonacich centrality measure in the network (G +G)T under discount
factor α,
x∗ ∝ β((G+GT ), α).
Hence the optimal choice of the planner is to assign discriminatory actions to the agents, in
proportion to their Bonacich centrality measure in the network (G +G)T .6 We now observe that
the planner’s general problem encompasses different situations of pricing and targeting in networks.
2.2.1 Pricing with network externalities
Consider, as in Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [6] and Bloch and Que´rou [4] a monopolist setting
prices on a market where consumers experience positive consumption externalities. For simplicity,
assume that the monopolist faces a constant marginal unit cost c. Consumer i’s utility depends
both on his own consumption and on the consumption of his neighbors in the social network. If the
monopolist sets a unit price pi to consumer i, and offers a quantity xi, the utility of the consumer
is given by
Ui = axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj − pixi.
well-defined.
6Strictly speaking, (G +G)T is a weighted network, with weights equal to 0, 1 or 2 on each link.
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Assuming that the monopolist can fully discriminate among consumers, she will select a price
pi to capture the entire surplus of the consumer and make a profit
π =
∑
i∈N
(pi − c)xi =
∑
i∈N
(
(a− c)xi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj
)
,
an objective function which is equivalent to the objective function V in equation (1) after a renor-
malization.
2.2.2 Targeting and efforts
Next we consider as in Galeotti, Golub and Goyal [10] the decision xi chosen by an agent with
utility function
Ui = axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj .
The planner intervenes by subsidizing or taxing the marginal stand-alone utility of the effort,
resulting in aˆi = a + ti, where ti is the tax or subsidy of agent i. Any intervention leading to a
change from a to aˆi will result in a change in the effort level xi. Hence an intervention can be
interpreted as a choice of decisions xi to maximize the sum of utilities of the agents
V =
∑
i∈N
(
axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj
)
.7
2.3 Network architectures and information structures
Proposition 1 characterizes the first-best solution when the planner has complete information on
the social network. We now introduce the constraints faced by the planner when she only has access
to anonymized information on the network architecture.
Consider two networks g and g′. These networks share the same network architecture if they
are equivalent, up to a relabeling of the agents. Formally, two networks g and g′ are equivalent
(denoted gEg′) if there exists a permutation π of the nodes such that g′ij = gpi(i)pi(j) for all i, j.
A network architecture gˆ is an equivalence class of the relation E over the set of all graphs. The
cardinality of the equivalence class gˆ varies according to the graph g and depends on the symmetry
group of the graph g. If the graph is symmetric (for example an empty graph or a complete graph),
there is exactly one element in gˆ and the information of the planner is complete. If on the other
hand the symmetry group of the graph g is empty and all nodes occupy different positions, there
7Note that Galeotti, Golub and Goyal [10] assume the planner faces a fixed budget and incurs a cost which is
quadratic in the difference between the initial value a and the target value aˆi. This results in an additional constraint
in the planner’s problem. When the budget is sufficiently large, this additional constraint is not binding and the
problem is equivalent to the problem we consider here.
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are exactly n! elements in the equivalence class gˆ. If there exists a subset of nodes S such that
the graph restricted to S is symmetric, there are (n− s)! elements in the equivalence graph gˆ. To
illustrate, if n = 3, there are exactly 16 network architectures for directed graphs.8
The network architecture is common knowledge. We assume that every agent observes, in
addition to the network architecture, his position in the network. He may also observe other
elements of the network, like the identity of his neighbors. Hence the information structure of agent
i is a refinement of the information structure of the planner. We let Ei(g) the cell of agent i’s
information partition at g. We let E(g) = {E1(g), ..., En(g)} denote the set of possible information
cells (or types) of the agents. To illustrate the information structures of the planner and the agents,
consider the following network with three agents, where we assume that the agent’s information
structure is minimal (they only observe their location).
Example 1
2 1 3 1 2 3 1 3 2
2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 1
g1 g2 g3
g4 g5 g6
The true network is network g1. The planner is unable to identify agents in the network and
hence will consider the equivalence class of g1, E(g1) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}. Agent 1 knows that
the network can either be g1 or g5 and hence identifies the cell in his information partition as
E1(g1) = {g1, g5}. Similarly, agent 2 identifies the cell as E2(g1) = {g1, g4} and agent 3 identifies
the cell as E3(g1) = {g1, g2}. Notice that, by pooling the information of any pair of agents, the
planner is able to exactly identify the network as g1.
2.4 The planner’s mechanism
We let the planner design a mechanism to extract information from the agents about their location
in the network. For any network g, the planner learns the network architecture gˆ, and determines
the list of possible types of the agents E(g) = {E1(g), ..., En(g)}. Every agent i sends to the planner
an element in E(g), denoted Eˆi(g). Given the vector of announcements Eˆ(g) = (Eˆ1(g), .., Eˆn(g)),
the planner selects a vector of decisions x = (x1, .., xn).
8See http://mathinsight.org/image/three_node_motifs.
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We require the mechanism to be ex-post incentive compatible: for any network g, every agent
should have an incentive to report Ei(g) rather than the cell of the partition corresponding to
another agent. Formally
Definition 1 A contract x = (x1, ..., xn) is ex-post incentive compatible at a network architecture
gˆ if, for any g ∈ gˆ, for any i, for any Ej(g) 6= Ei(g) ∈ E(g),
Ui
(
x(Ei(g), E−i(g))
)
≥ Ui
(
x(Ej(g), E−i(g))
)
.
As we will see, correlation of agents’ types makes it easy for the planner to construct incentive
compatible contracts. We thus extend the definition of ex-post incentive compatibility to allow for
joint deviations by coalitions of players. In the benchmark model, we assume that coalition S must
contain adjacent players. Formally
Definition 2 A coalition S contains adjacent players if and only if, for all i, j ∈ S, gij + gji ≥ 1.
The idea underlying this requirement is that, in order to engineer a joint deviation of reports,
players in a coalition must communicate with each other, and hence be directly connected in the
social network. In Section 5, we will also discuss what happens when coalitions of nonadjacent
players can misreport, and show that this may result in additional constraints on the contract.
We assume that if a coalition S deviates, the identities of all members of S are revealed to
each other, so that agents in the deviating coalition can exactly evaluate their payoff following the
deviation. (This assumption is reminiscent of the definition of the “fine core” in Wilson (1978) [14],
where agents pool their information to engineer a deviation in an exchange economy with incomplete
information). Absent this assumption, agents would be unable to identify the quantities consumed
by their neighbors and hence the level of externalities they enjoy. Notice that agents in S will thus
refine their information after the deviation is proposed. However, as the planner is unaware that
the coalition S forms and jointly misreports, she will be unable to exploit this fact in the design of
the contract.
Definition 3 A contract x = (x1, ..., xn) is ex-post group incentive compatible at a network ar-
chitecture gˆ if, for any g ∈ gˆ, there does not exist a coalition S containing adjacent players and a
mapping k(j) from S to N such that, for every agent i in S,
Ui
(
x((Ek(j)(g))j∈S , (Ej(g))j /∈S)
)
> Ui
(
x((Ej(g))j∈S , (Ej(g))j /∈S)
)
.
We will argue that this condition makes deviations very hard, because it requires all players to
be strictly better off from the joint misreporting. A weaker notion, allowing for transfers across
players in the deviating coalition S, will result in easier deviations (thereby making positive results
on the optimal contract even stronger).
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Definition 4 A contract x = (x1, ..., xn) is ex-post group incentive compatible with transfers at
a network architecture gˆ if, for any g ∈ gˆ, there does not exist a coalition S containing adjacent
players and a mapping k(j) from S to N such that,
∑
i∈S
Ui(x(Ek(j)(g))j∈S , (Ej(g))j /∈S) >
∑
i∈S
Ui(x(Ej(g))j∈S , (Ej(g))j /∈S).
2.5 A menu of contracts
In the benchmark case, we restrict the planner to offer a simple menu of contracts. Fix one
representative of the equivalence class gˆ, and let l = 1, 2, ..., n denote the corresponding arbitrary
labeling of the nodes. We call this labeling the locations in the graph. Let ℓ : N → N denote any
permutation of the agents in N , which we interpret as an assignment of agents to locations. The
permutation corresponding to the specific network g is denoted ℓ(g). Hence, for any agent i, ℓi(g)
denotes the true location of agent i in the graph g.
The planner offers a menu of contracts {xl}, corresponding to the decisions at each and every
of the locations. Every agent then selects a contract among the menu {xl}. If all agents select
different contracts, each agent obtains the contract he selected. Otherwise, if several agents select
the same location, the planner punishes all agents and chooses an outcome x = 0.
This simple menu of contracts only uses information about agents’ locations, and not any ad-
ditional information that the agents can have about the network (such as the identity of their
neighbors). In Section 5, we explore more complex contracts when agents have additional infor-
mation on the network, and show that the planner will often be able to implement his first-best
contract, exploiting the correlation between agents’ types. However, we defend the menu of con-
tracts as a very simple contract which is a realistic approximation of the contracts offered in reality.
In particular, this contract only relies on information on the network topology (the locations of the
different nodes) and does not require any additional information, such as the identity of the agents.
In addition, as we show below, if the agents only know their location in the network, and do not
have any other information, the menu of contracts is equivalent to any other mechanism chosen by
the planner.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the agents only know their location in the network. If the mecha-
nism (x1, .., xl) is incentive compatible then every agent i chooses the contract corresponding to his
location, i.e.
Ui
(
x(ℓg)
)
≥ Ui
(
x(k(i), ℓ−i(g))
)
, ∀k(i) 6= ℓi(j).
If the mechanism is group incentive compatible then there does not exist a coalition S of adjacent
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players and a mapping k(j) from S to N such that, for every agent i in S,
Ui
(
x(k(j)j∈S , ℓj(g)j /∈S)
)
≥ Ui
(
x(ℓg)
)
.
If the mechanism is group incentive compatible with transfers then there does not exist a coalition
S of adjacent players and a mapping k(j) from S to N such that,
∑
i∈S
Ui
(
x(k(j)j∈S , ℓj(g)j /∈S)
)
>
∑
i∈S
Ui(x(ℓg)).
Proof of Proposition 2: We simply observe that Ei(g) = {g ∈ gˆ|, ℓi = ℓi(g)}. There is a one-
to-one relation between the messages sent by the agent in the general mechanism and the location
of agents in the sorting game. In the general mechanism, any coalition S of agents chooses a set
of mapping assigning a location to each agent, k(j) as in the sorting game. When all players
announce Ei(g), the planner associates one location to each agent, and hence all agents choose
different contracts in the menu. If some agents choose to make the same announcement Ei(g), they
must obtain a low payoff in the mechanism, corresponding to the 0 payoff in the menu of contracts.

2.6 Efficient incentive compatible contracts
When agents do not coordinate their announcements, the planner can exploit correlation across
types to implement an efficient contract. This result follows from the same intuition as in Cre´mer
and McLean [7] who prove that efficient contracts can be implemented when agents’ types are
correlated. Whenever the planner receives inconsistent announcements, showing that one agent has
misreported his type, she chooses to punish all agents. More specifically we prove the following
result.
Proposition 3 Any contract x where agents obtain positive payoffs is ex-post incentive compatible
at any network architecture gˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that whenever the planner receives two announcements Ei(g)
corresponding to the same location i, she chooses to assign 0. Then, for any agent i,
Ui((x(Ei(g), E−i(g))) = axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj ≥ 0 = Ui(x(Ej(g), E−i(g))),
showing that the incentive compatibility constraint is always satisfied. 
In particular, the optimal contract x∗ is incentive compatible.
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2.7 Group incentive compatible contracts
As individuals cannot gain by individually deviating from the truth, we now turn our attention to
deviations by groups of agents. First notice, as in the proof of Proposition 3, that if an agent i
in S ⊂ N reports the information cell of an agent j who does not belong to S, the planner will
be able to detect that one of the agent lied, and punish all agents with a decision 0. Hence, if a
deviation by a group of agents in S is profitable, it must involve a report which is a permutation of
the types of agents inside S. Using the definition of the agent’s utilities, this observation enables
us to rewrite the constraints faced by the planner under group incentive compatibility.
A contract x = (x1, .., xn) is group incentive compatible if there does not exist a coalition S of
adjacent players and a permutation ρS of agents in S such that for all i ∈ S,
axρS(i) −
1
2
x2ρS(i) + α
∑
j∈S
gijxρS(i)gijxρS(j) + α
∑
j /∈S
gijxρS(i)xj > axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j∈N
gijxixj .
We obtain the following important result:
Proposition 4 The optimal contract g∗ is group incentive compatible for any network architecture
gˆ if the size of the group |S| is 2, 3 or 4.
The proof of proposition 4 is in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 shows that no coalition of size 2, 3 or 4 can construct a group deviation, which
makes all agents strictly better off. The logic of the Proposition is transparent in the case of devi-
ations by pairs, when |S| = 2. The optimal contract x∗ always assigns quantities which are higher
than the optimal quantities of the agents, as the planner takes into account the positive externalities
resulting from higher quantities. Hence, for a fixed set of quantities of the other players k, a player
i has no incentive to accept the quantity offered to player j when x∗i < x
∗
j . When a pair (i, j) of
players exchanges quantities, the externalities they experience from each other remain identical,
equal to x∗i x
∗
j . Hence there is no possibility for both players to benefit from the exchange as one
of them must be accepting a higher quantity than the quantity he obtains by reporting truthfully
his type. The same type of argument applies in a more complex way when |S| = 3 or |S| = 4 by
considering different joint ways of misreporting, and focusing attention on those agents who tarde
their quantity x∗i for a higher quantity. When |S| is strictly greater than 4, whether the optimal
contract is group incentive for arbitrary graph architectures remains an open question. Proposition
4 suggests that asking for all agents to increase their payoff by a joint deviation might be too de-
manding. Hence it will often be important to study the weaker deviation concept, when transfers
are allowed.
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A contract x = (x1, .., xn) is group incentive compatible with transfers if there does not exist a
coalition S of adjacent players and a permutation ρS of agents in S such that
∑
i∈S
(
axρS(i) −
1
2
x2ρS(i) + α
∑
j /∈S
gijxρS(i)xj
)
>
∑
i∈S
(
axi −
1
2
x2i + α
∑
j /∈S
gijxixj
)
To interpret the last condition, notice that by definition
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S gijxρS(i)xρS(j) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S gijxixj .
In addition, as agents are homogeneous,
∑
i∈S(axρS(i)−
1
2x
2
ρS(i)
) =
∑
i∈S(axi −
1
2x
2
i ), and the con-
dition for group incentive compatible contracts with transfers reduces to
∑
i∈S
∑
j /∈S
gijxρS(i)xj ≤
∑
i∈S
∑
j /∈S
gijxixj∀S, ∀ρS (2)
3 Undirected Networks
In this Section, we consider undirected network architectures, where agents’ influence is reciprocal,
and the adjacency matrix G is symmetric. This corresponds for example to team production with
synergy across workers, or consumption externalities for agents using the same software, same
standard or same communication device. Our main Proposition shows that, in that case, the
optimal contract is group incentive compatible with transfers.
Proposition 5 If the network g is undirected, then the optimal contract x∗ is group incentive
compatible with transfers.
Proof: We first show that there does not exist a pair of connected agents (i, j) who can benefit
from a deviation. Suppose that this were the case, then we would have
x∗j
∑
k 6=j∈N
gikx
∗
k + x
∗
i
∑
k 6=i∈N
gjkx
∗
k > x
∗
i
∑
k 6=j∈N
gikx
∗
k + x
∗
j
∑
k 6=i∈N
gjkx
∗
k,
As gij = gji = 1, we can add 2x
∗
i x
∗
j on both sides of the inequality, to obtain
x∗j
∑
k∈N
gikx
∗
k + x
∗
i
∑
k∈N
gjkx
∗
k > x
∗
i
∑
k∈N
gikx
∗
k + x
∗
j
∑
k∈N
gjkx
∗
k,
and collecting terms
(x∗j − x
∗
i )(
∑
k∈N
gikx
∗
k −
∑
k∈N
gjkx
∗
k) > 0. (3)
Now recall that x∗ = (I−αG)−11, the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure vector. By construction,
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the Katz-Bonacich centrality of an agent i can be recursively expressed as a function of the Katz-
Bonacich centrality of agent i’s neighbors:
bi(G, α) = 1 + 2α
∑
k∈N
gikbk(G, α).
But then, if bj(G, α) > bi(G, α), we must have
∑
k∈N gjkbk(G, α) >
∑
k∈N gikbk(G, α), contra-
dicting equation (3).
In the second step of the proof, we show that there cannot exist a coalition of adjacent players
of size k > 2 which has a profitable deviation. Suppose that it were the case and let ρ denote the
permutation of players in S which results in a profitable deviation. We must then have
∑
i∈S
∑
j /∈S
gijxρS(i)xj >
∑
i∈S
∑
j /∈S
gijxixj .
Because gij = 1 for all i, j ∈ S, we can add to the left and right sides of the inequality
2
∑
i,j∈S xixj = 2
∑
i,j∈S xρS(i)xρS(j) to obtain
∑
i∈S
∑
j 6=i
gijxρS(i)xj >
∑
i∈S
∑
j 6=i
gijxixj . (4)
Next order the vector of x so that xi ≤ xi+1 for all i ∈ S and let all indices outside S be larger
than the indices in S. Then we can rewrite equation (4) as
(xρS(1) − x1)
∑
j
g1jxj + (xρS(2) − x2)
∑
j
g2jxj + .....+ (xρS(s) − xs)
∑
j
gsjxj > 0. (5)
Next consider the set of agents in S such that ρ(i) 6= i, discard all other agents in S and reorder
if needed the indices so that all remaining agents in S have lower indices. Let t be the size of the
remaining set of indices. For any j ∈ {1, .., t} define the following two sets of indices:
Aj = {i|ρ(i) ≥ j + 1 > j ≥ i},
Bj = = {i|i ≥ j + 1 > j ≥ ρ(i)}.
Clearly Aj ∩ Bj = ∅. We now show by induction that |Aj | = |Bj | and that max{i|i ∈ Aj} <
min{i|i ∈ Bj} for all j.
Consider the initial step at j = 1. Then clearly ρ(1) > 1 and we have A1 = {1}. Let k be the
unique antecedent of 1, i.e. ρ(k) = 1. Then B1 = {k} and hence |A1| = |B1| = 1 and k > 1.
Next assume that |Aj−1| = |Bj−1| and max{i|i ∈ Aj−1} < min{i|i ∈ Bj−1}. Consider the sets
Aj and Bj . By construction we have
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Aj = Aj−1 \ {i|ρ(i) = j > j − 1 ≥ i} ∪ {i|ρ(i) ≥ j + 1 > j = i}
Bj = Bj−1 \ {i|i = j > j − 1 ≥ ρ(i)} ∪ {i|i ≥ j + 1 > j = ρ(i)}
Now let k be the antecedent of j in the permutation ρ, i.e. ρ(k) = j. We consider the four
following cases:
Case 1. ρ(j) > j, j > k In that case Aj = Aj−1 \ {k} ∪ {j}, Bj = Bj−1 and hence |Aj | = |Bj |.
Furthermore, j > i for all i ∈ Aj−1 so j = max{i|i ∈ Aj}. Finally, i ≥ j for all j ∈ Bj−1 and as
j /∈ Bj , min{i|i ∈ Bj} > j = max{i|i ∈ Aj}.
Case 2. ρ(j) > j, k > j In that case Aj = Aj−1 ∪ {j}, Bj = Bj−1 ∪ {k} and hence |Aj | = |Bj |. As
k > j, if max{i|i ∈ Aj−1} < min{i|i ∈ Bj−1}, we must also have min{i|i ∈ Bj} > j = max{i|i ∈
Aj}.
Case 3. ρ(j) < j, j > k In that case Aj = Aj−1 \ {k}, Bj = Bj−1 \ {j} and hence |Aj | = |Bj |.
Furthermore, as Aj ⊂ Aj−1, max{i|i ∈ Aj} ≤ max{i|i ∈ Aj−1} and as Bj ⊂ Bj−1, then min{i|i ∈
Bj} ≥ min{i|i ∈ Bj−1}. Hence min{i|i ∈ Bj} ≥ max{i|i ∈ Aj}.
Case 4. ρ(j) < j, k > j In that case Aj = Aj−1 and Bj = Bj−1 \ {j} ∪ {k} and hence |Aj | = |Bj |.
In addition as k > j, min{i|i ∈ Bj} ≥ min{i|i ∈ Bj−1} > max{i|i ∈ Aj−1} = max{i|i ∈ Aj}.
Now rewrite equation (5) as
t−1∑
j=1
(xj+1 − xj)(
∑
i∈Aj
∑
k
gikxk −
∑
i∈Bj
∑
k
gikxk) > 0. (6)
Now because Aj | = |Bj |, we can pick for any i ∈ Aj a corresponding index l in Bj and as l > i,
we also have xl > xi. But by equation (3), if (i, l) does not have a profitable deviation and xl > xi
we must have
∑
k
glkxk ≥
∑
k
gikxk.
But this implies that for all j
(
∑
i∈Aj
∑
k
gikxk −
∑
i∈Bj
∑
k
gikxk) ≤ 0,
contradicting equation (6). This contradiction completes the proof of the Proposition.
Proposition 5 shows that when influence is reciprocal, coalitions of adjacent agents cannot
benefit from jointly misreporting their locations when the planner proposes the optimal contract.
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This result is due to the fact that in an undirected network agents with higher levels in the first-
best contract are agents who receive and produce the larger externalities. Hence, constructing
a group deviation against the first-best contract becomes impossible, because agents with higher
levels are also agents with higher externalities. This is a very strong result because the definition
of coalitional deviations is very permissive – we allow for any transfer across coalition members.
The only restriction we place on the deviating coalition is that it should contain adjacent agents.
As the proof demonstrates, if we only consider pairs of agents swapping their announcements, this
condition is not needed: the optimal contract is robust to any deviation by pairs of players, whether
they are adjacent or not. However, for larger coalitions, the restriction that only adjacent players
can form a deviating coalition is meaningful, as we will illustrate in section 5
4 Hierarchical Networks
We next consider very asymmetric structures. Agents are organized in a hierarchy. Agents at higher
levels of the hierarchy influence agents below them, without being influenced by them. For any
pair of agents, externalities only flow in one direction, from agents at higher tiers to agents at lower
tiers. Formally, we partition the set of agents into M tiers of a hierarchy, A1, .., AM with M ≥ 2
such that gij = 1 if and only if i ∈ Am, j ∈ Aq and q < m. 9
Proposition 6 In a hierarchical network, the optimal contract x∗ is group incentive compatible.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a coalition S of adjacent agents and a permutation ρ such that
every agent i in S has a higher payoff by exchanging locations according to ρ at the optimal contract
x∗. There must be a set of agents S− for whom x∗ρ(i) > x
∗
i . Among those agents, pick an agent
i belonging to the highest level of the hierarchy so that gij = 0 for any j ∈ S−. For that agent,
(x∗ρ(j) − xj) < 0 for any j ∈ S, such that gij = 1. Hence, as (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i ) > 0,
∆Ui = α[−
∑
j /∈S
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )gjix
∗
j −
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )
2
2
+
∑
j∈S
gijx
∗
ρ(i)(x
∗
ρ(j) − xj)−
∑
j∈S
gjix
∗
j (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i )].
< 0
contradicting the fact that agent i has an incentive to deviate. 
Proposition 6 shows that groups of players, even if they are larger than three, cannot organize
exchanges of locations which make all the agents strictly better off. Among agents who are assigned
higher quantities than the first-best quantity, the agent in the highest tier of the hierarchy only
9We later consider an alternative formulation where q ≤ m, i.e. agents in the same level of the hierarchy influence
each other.
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enjoys externalities from agents who exchange their quantities for lower quantities. Hence the agent
can surely not increase his utility by receiving a higher quantity.
4.1 Single root
While Proposition 6 shows that the optimal contract is immune to group deviations in hierarchical
networks, we will now see that, contrary to the case of undirected networks, the sum of utilities
of agents in a deviating coalition can increase. In order to analyze group incentive compatible
contracts with transfers, we first consider hierarchical networks with a single root.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the hierarchy has a single root, |A1| = 1 and that all agents are
connected to the root and that the hierarchy contains more than two tiers. Then agents at tiers
m = 3, ..,M must receive the same quantity as the root agent in the optimal contract satisfying
group incentive compatibility with transfers.
Proof: Consider a two-player deviation with transfers between any agent i in Am, m > 2 and the
root agent j in A1. We must have
∑
k 6=j
gikxjxk +
∑
k 6=i
xixk ≤
∑
k 6=j
gikxixk +
∑
k 6=i
gjkxjxk,
Next, as gjk = 0 for all k, this condition amounts to
∑
k 6=j
gikxjxk ≤
∑
k 6=j
gikxixk,
or xj ≤ xi. Notice that this condition must hold for any pair (i, j) where j is the root agent and
i ∈ Ak, k > 2.
Suppose that the planner selects a contract x such that xj < xi for some i ∈ Am for m > 2.
Consider the marginal effect of increasing xj by ǫ and reducing xi by ǫ on the sum of payoffs:
∑
∆U = −
(xi − ǫ)2 − x2i
2
−
(xj + ǫ)
2 − x2j
2
− αǫ
∑
k
(gik + gki)xk + αǫ
∑
k
(gjk + gkj)xk.
= ǫ(xi − xj)− ǫ
2 − αǫ
∑
k
(gik + gki)xk + αǫ
∑
k
(gjk + gkj)xk.
Now recall that in a hierarchical network, gik + gjk ≤ 1. Because player j is connected to all
agents, gjk + gkj = 1 for all k 6= j. Player i is at best connected to all agents so gik + gki ≤ 1 for
all k 6= i. Now
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∑k
(gjk + gkj)xk −
∑
k
(gik + gki)xk = (xi − xj) +
∑
k 6=i,j
(1− (gik + gki))xk,
≥ (xi − xj)
> 0
so that
∑
∆U > 0.
for small enough ǫ. This shows that the optimal contract satisfying group incentive compatible
with transfers must assign the same quantity to xi and xj . .
Proposition 7 shows that agents in tiers m = 3, ..,M must receive the same quantity as the root
agent. Suppose by contradiction that the root agent receives a higher quantity. We claim that she
has an incentive to exchange her location with any other agents at a tier m ≥ 3, as those agents
receive positive externalities form agents at tier 2, in addition to the positive externalities from
the root agent, whereas the root agent does not receive any positive externality. Hence a contract
which satisfies group incentive compatibility with transfers must assign to the root agent a quantity
which is lower or equal than the quantity of agents at tiers m ≥ 3. As the sum of utilities increases
when the quantity assigned to the root agent increases, this implies that the best contract must
assign uniform quantities to agents in tiers m = 1, 3, ..,M .
As long as not all agents are connected to each other (in which case they all receive the same
quantity at the optimal contract x∗), some agents must receive different quantities at the optimal
contract x∗. This shows that the optimal contract is not group incentive compatible with contracts.
The incentive constraint binds and forces the planner to equalize quantities offered agents at different
tiers of the hierarchy.
Interestingly, Proposition 7 does not restrict the quantities offered at tier m = 2. Agents at
tier m = 2 have no incentive to exchange their location with the root agent, as the sum of utilities
remains exactly the same after the exchange. Whether agents at tier 2 have an incentive to exchange
locations with agents at lower tiers depends on the precise structure of the network, and cannot be
ascertained in general. Hence, in general, the choice of quantities to agents in the second tier of the
network remains unrestricted.
Finally, we note that, because quantities at the second level of the hierarchy are unrestricted,
Proposition 7 does not hold whenM = 2. In that case, the group incentive constraint with transfers
is not binding, and the optimal contract x∗ is immune to group deviations with transfers.
We next consider a situation where either the first level of the hierarchy contains multiple roots,
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or agents are not all connected to the single root.
4.2 Nested neighborhoods
We first analyze a hierarchy with multiple roots, where neighborhoods are nested, so that agents
at lower tiers of the hierarchy are influenced by the same agents as agents at higher tiers of the
hierarchy.
Formally, for any three tiers m, p, q with m < p < q, we have
∀i,∈ Aq, ∀j ∈ Ap, such that gij = 1, {k|gik = 1} ∪ Am = {k|gjk = 1} ∪ Am.
This definition covers the case where agents at tier q are influenced by all agents at higher tiers
of the hierarchy. But it also covers cases where agents are only influenced by a subset of agents
at higher tiers of the hierarchy, as long as the influence relation is equal to its transitive closure:
namely, for i ∈ Aq, j ∈ Ap, k ∈ Am, gik = 1 if and only if gij = 1 and gjk = 1. Figure 4.2 illustrates
a hierarchy with nested neighborhoods and three tiers.
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
Proposition 8 Consider a hierarchy with nested neighborhoods such that all agents are connected
to more than one root, and |Am| ≤ |Am+1| for all m = 1, ..,M − 1. Then all agents receive the
same quantity in the optimal contract satisfying group incentive compatibility with transfers.
Proof: Let i be any agent at a tier Am, m ≥ 2 and j be a root agent. For the contract to be
immune to a deviation by the pair (i, j), we must have
∑
k 6=j
gikxjxk ≤
∑
k 6=j
gikxixk,
Because every agent is connected to at least two root agents,
∑
k 6=j gik 6= 0, so that we must have
xj ≤ xi.
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Now, suppose by contradiction that xj < xi and compute the effect of a small decrease in xi
couple with a small increase in xj on the sum of utilities:
∑
∆U = ǫ(xi − xj)− ǫ
2 − αǫ
∑
k
(gik + gki)xk + αǫ
∑
k
(gjk + gkj)xk.
To complete the proof of the Proposition, we need to show
∑
k gkjxk ≥
∑
k(gik + gki)xk.
Consider first agents k ∈ Aq with q > m so that gik = 0. By the definition of nested neighborhoods,
if gki = 1 then gkj = 1, so
∑
k∈Aq
gkjxk ≥
∑
k∈Aq
gkixi.
Consider next agents k ∈ Aq, 1 < q < m. Suppose that gik = 1 and gkj = 0. Then, by the definition
of nested neighborhoods we must have gij = 0, contradicting the fact that i is connected to j. So
we must have gkj = 1 and hence again
∑
k∈Aq
gkjxk ≥
∑
k∈Aq
gkixi.
We finally consider k ∈ A1, k 6= j and k ∈ Am 6= i. Recall that if k ∈ A1 and k′ ∈ Am, xk ≤ x′k.
Furthermore, by assumption |Am| ≥ |A1, so that
∑
k′∈Am
gk′jxk′ ≤
∑
k∈A1
gikxk,
completing the proof of the Proposition. 
Proposition 8 displays a family of hierarchies with multiple roots for which the group incentive
compatibility constraint forces the planner to select uniform quantities in the network. The planner
is unable to target agents at different locations, as agents always have an incentive to exchange their
locations with one of the root agents. This may result in vary large efficiency losses for the planner,
as the optimal contract clearly discriminates among agents, offering higher quantities to agents at
higher tiers in the hierarchy. Observe that Proposition 8 relies on the fact that the number of agents
is nondecreasing at lower levels of the hierarchy. As the following example shows, if this condition
fails, the optimal contract may very well be group incentive compatible with transfers.
Example 2 Suppose that n = 4, agents 1, 2, 3 belong to the first level of the hierarchy and a single
agent 4 to the second level A2, i.e. g41 = g42 = g43 = 1 and gij = 0 for all other ij. Then in the
first-best contract we have
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x∗1 = a+ αx
∗
4,
x∗4 = a+ 3αx
∗
1,
so that
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 =
a(1 + α)
1− 3α2
< x∗4 =
a(1 + 3α)
1− 3α2
.
The optimal contract assigns a higher quantity to the agent at the lower level A2, so that the
group incentive compatibility with transfers constraint holds.
4.3 Regular Oriented Trees
We next consider hierarchies with a single root, but where agents are not all connected to the
root. Instead, the hierarchy is a tree oriented towards the root, so that any node i has a single
neighbor in the directed network, located at the tier immediately above him. We let σi denote
the set of immediate predecessors of agent i in the oriented tree. We suppose that at any tier Am
of the hierarchy, |σi| = |σj | for all i, j ∈ Am. Hence the oriented tree is regular: there are the
same number of predecessor nodes for any node at the same tier of the tree. Figure 4.3 illustrates
a regular tree oriented towards the root with n = 7 agents. In this example σ1 = {2, 3, 4}, σ2 =
{5}, σ3 = {6}, σ4 = {7}, σ5 = σ6 = σ7 = ∅.
1
2 3 4
5 6 7
The following Proposition shows that, when the number of predecessors is higher for higher tiers
in the oriented tree, the optimal contract is immune to group deviations with transfers.
Proposition 9 Consider a regular oriented tree such that, |σi| < |σj | if i ∈ Am, j ∈ Aq and m < q.
Then the optimal contract x∗ is group incentive compatible with transfers.
Proof: Because every agent has a single neighbor, the only adjacent coalitions are pairs of agents
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(i, j) such that gij = 1. We show that the optimal contract is immune to deviations by pairs of
players with transfers. First note that if j ∈ A1, i ∈ A2, then, as there is no k 6= j such that gik = 1
and by definition gjk = 0 for all k. Hence, any pair of quantities is group incentive compatible with
transfers.
Next pick two agents j, i in Am, Am+1 with m ≥ 2. Notice that there is no agent different from
j such that gik = 1 whereas gjk = 1 for some agent k ∈ Am−1. Hence the condition
∑
k 6=j
gikxjxk +
∑
k 6=i
xixk ≤
∑
k 6=j
gikxixk +
∑
k 6=i
gjkxjxk,
is equivalent to
xi ≤ xj for all i, j such that gij = 1, j 6= A1. (7)
Hence any contract for which xi ≤ xj whenever gij = 1 is group incentive compatible with transfers.
Next, we show that the optimal contract x∗ satisfies condition (7). The proof is by induction
on the tier of the hierarchy. Notice that because the tree is regular, x∗i = x
∗
j for any i, j at the same
tier of the hierarchy. Hence, we let x∗m denote the common quantity at tier m of the hierarchy.
Consider (i, j) such that gij = 1 and i ∈ AM , j ∈ AM−1. Then |σi| = ∅. Let l be the successor
of j in the oriented tree. The optimal contract satisfies
x∗i = a+ αx
∗
j ,
x∗j = a+ αx
∗
i + α
∑
k|gkj=1
x∗k + αx
∗
l
so that
(x∗i − x
∗
j )(1− α) = −α
∑
k|gkj=1
x∗k + αx
∗
l < 0.
This shows that x∗M < x∗M−1.
Next suppose that x∗q < x∗q−1 for any q > m and consider a pair (i, j) with gij = 1, i ∈ Am, j ∈
Am−1. Let l be the successor of j. The optimal contract satisfies
x∗i = a+ αx
∗
j + α
∑
k|gki=1
x∗k,
x∗j = a+ αx
∗
i + α
∑
k 6=i,gkj=1
x∗k + αx
∗
l .
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Hence
(x∗i − x
∗
j )(1− α) = −α(
∑
k 6=i,gkj=1
x∗k −
∑
k|gki=1
x∗k)− αx
∗
l .
Now, by assumption |σj | ≥ |σi| + 1, so |{k 6= i, gkj = 1}| ≥ |{k|gik = 1}|. In addition, by the
induction hypothesis, x∗k > x
∗
l for any k, l such that gki = glj = 1 as k ∈ Am+1, l ∈ Am and by
the induction hypothesis x∗m > x∗m+1. This shows that x∗i < x
∗
j , completing the proof of the
Proposition. 
Proposition 9 shows that in a regular oriented tree, the optimal contract can be sustained by the
planner. When every agent is influenced by a single predecessor, the contract is immune to exchange
by two adjacent agents if and only if the predecessor has a greater quantity than the successor. The
optimal contract x∗ assigns to every agent a quantity which is proportional to her Katz-Bonacich
centrality measure in the undirected tree. When the tree is regular, the Katz-Bonacich centrality
measure will be higher at higher tiers whenever the number of agents connected to another agent
is lower at lower tiers of the hierarchy.
Notice that the assumption that the number of agents connected to another agent is lower at
lower levels of the hierarchy is crucial for the proof of Proposition 9. Consider for example a line
of five agents, n = 5, g12 = g23 = g34 = g45 = 1, gij = 0 for all other pairs (i, j). It is easy to
check that the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure is highest at the center of the line, and decreases
towards the edges, so that x∗3 > x
∗
2 = x
∗
4 > x
∗
1 = x
∗
5. But then the condition x
∗
4 ≥ x
∗
3 is violated,
and the optimal contract is not immune to a deviation by the two players, 3 and 4.
4.4 Connected agents at the same tier of the hierarchy
Next consider an alternative formulation, where agents are influenced by other agents at the same
level of the hierarchy, i. e gij = 1 if i, j ∈ Am. In that case, we do not know whether Proposition
6 holds, as the argument showing that the optimal contract is group incentive compatible relies on
the fact that the agent at the highest level of the hierarchy in S− does not have any connection to
other agents in S−. Proposition 7 may also be violated, as the first-best contract can assign a higher
quantity to agents at lower levels of the hierarchy. For example, suppose that n = 5, A1 = {1} ,
A2 = {2}, A3 = {3, 4, 5}. We have g21 = g31 = g32 = g34 = g35 = g41 = g42 = g43 = g45 = g51 =
g52 = g53 = g54 = 1 and gij = 0 otherwise. The first-best contract solves
x∗1 = a+ αx
∗
2 + 3αx
∗
3,
x∗2 = a+ αx
∗
1 + 3αx
∗
3,
x∗3 = a+ αx
∗
1 + αx
∗
2 + 4αx
∗
3
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so that
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
a(1− α)
1− 5α− 2α2
< x∗3 = x
∗
4 = x
∗
5 =
a(1 + α)
1− 5α− 2α2
,
and the first-best contract satisfies the group incentive compatibility with transfers condition.
5 Robustness and Extensions
5.1 Nonadjacent agents
When the deviating coalitions comprise any set of players (not necessarily adjacent), the first-best
contract may fail to be immune to group deviations with transfers. We illustrate this fact by looking
at the two families of network architectures for which the first-best contract has been shown to be
immune to deviations by coalitions of adjacent agents: undirected networks and regular oriented
trees.
5.1.1 Undirected networks
Example 3 Consider 8 agents organized in two disjoint stars as in the following picture
4
1
2 5
6
3
7 8
In a star with three peripheral nodes, the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure of the hub is given
by x∗ = 1+3α1−3α2 and the Katz-Bonacich centrality of a peripheral node by y
∗ = 1+α1−3α2 for α <
1√
3
.
Notice that 3y∗ > x∗. It is easy to check that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate: if the
star and the hub exchange their quantities, the difference in utilities is given by
(y∗ − x∗)3y∗ + (x∗ − y∗)x∗ = (x∗ − y∗)(x∗ − 3y∗) < 0,
Suppose now that three agents deviate, the hubs of the two stars, agents 1 and 3 and a peripheral
agent, agent 2. Furthermore, suppose that agents 2 and 3 exchange their quantities. The difference
in utilities for the coalition of three agents is given by
2(x∗ − y∗)x∗ − 3y∗(x∗ − y∗) = (x∗ − y∗)(2x∗ − 3y∗).
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Now, whenever α > 13 , this difference in utilities is positive. The loss in utilities of agent 3 (due
to the decrease in its quantity from x∗ to y∗ is more than compensated by the gain of agents 1 and
2, who can choose a transfer to convince agent 3 to participate in the deviating coalition. Hence
there exist intermediate values of α, 13 < α <
1√
3
for which the coalition of three non-adjacent
agents has an incentive to deviate even though no two-player coalition has an incentive to deviate.
5.1.2 Regular oriented tree
Example 4 Consider the 7 agent network of Figure 4.3.
In the optimal contract of the planner
x∗1 = a+ 3αx
∗
2,
x∗2 = a+ αx
∗
1 + αx
∗
5,
x∗5 = a+ αx
∗
2
yielding
x∗1 =
1 + 2α2 + 3α
1− 4α2
> x∗2 =
1
1− 4α2
> x∗3 =
1− α
1− 4α2
.
Now consider a deviation by the non-adjacent pair (1, 5). Then the difference in utilities is given
by
(x∗1 − x
∗
5)x
∗
2 > 0,
so that the pair has an incentive to deviate at the first-best contract.
5.2 Richer information structures and mechanisms
Agents know the identity of their neighbors
Suppose that agent i knows the identity of the agents he is influenced by, i.e. agents for which
gij = 1. Going back to example 1, agent 1 now observes the identity of his two neighbors and
has an information partition cell E1(g1) = {g1}. All other agents, and the planner, have the same
information structure. Under this assumption, the planner can increase the set of possible messages,
and ask agents to report an information cell E in a larger set of possible information cells, consistent
with the network architecture gˆ. We show that the planner can exploit the correlation between the
announcements of agents to implement the first-best contract, in the spirit of Cre´mer and McLean
(1988) [7]
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Proposition 10 Suppose that all agents know the identity of their neighbors. Then there exist a
mechanism such that the optimal contract x∗is group incentive compatible with transfers.
Proof: Consider a contract where the planner assigns {x∗1, ..., x
∗
n} to agents in location l = 1, .., n
when announcements are consistent and {0, .., 0} if announcements are inconsistent. Suppose that
there exists a profitable deviation by some coalition S resulting in decisions x 6= x∗. Then clearly
announcements must be consistent. By definition, the Because x∗ maximizes the sum of utilities of
the agents, if
∑
i∈S Ui(x) >
∑
i∈S Ui(x
∗, there must exist an agent j /∈ S such that Uj(x) < Uj(x∗.
As announcements are consistent and j truthfully announces his location, he must receive x∗j . Hence
if Uj(x) < Uj(x
∗,
∑
k gjkxk 6=
∑
k gjkx
∗
k. This means that the set of agents who declare to be at
locations k such that gjk = 1 cannot be the true set of neighbors of j. But then, there must be an
inconsistency in the announcements, contradicting the fact that x 6= {0, .., 0}. 
Proposition 10 shows that, if agents announce both their location and their list of neighbors, the
planner can implement the optimal contract at no cost. This mechanism extracts complex informa-
tion from the agents, checking the consistency of the list of neighbors and locations announced by
each agent. If instead one were to restrict attention to simple contracts, which are only based on
announcements of locations, then the analysis of the benchmark case would prevail. Hence we can
reinterpret the benchmark case with finer information structure of the agents, as a restriction on
the complexity of the contract. It assumes that the contract is a simple sorting mechanism, where
agents only announce locations, and obtain the payoff corresponding to their announced location if
a simple consistency check (no two agents announce the same location) is satisfied.
5.3 Partial information
The planner knows the identity of the root
Consider a 7 agent network, with a three-tier hierarchy with a single root, 1, two agents in the
second tier 2, 3 and four agents in the third tier, 4, 5, 6, 7.
1
2 3
4 5 6 7
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In the first-best contract, we have
x∗1 = a+ 2αx
∗
2,
x∗2 = a+ αx
∗
1 + 2αx
∗
4,
x∗4 = a+ αx
∗
1 + αx
∗
2
resulting in
x∗1 =
1 + 2α+ 6α2
1− 4α2 + 4α3
, x∗2 =
1 + 3α+ 2α2
1− 4α2 + 4α3
> x∗3 =
1 + 2α+ α2
1− 4α2 + 4α3
.
By Proposition 7, if the planner ignores the identity of the root, she must set x1 = x4 = x5 = x6.
Now suppose that the planner knows the identity of the root, so that the only possible deviating
coalitions are coalitions of agents at tiers 2 and 3. The first-best contract assigns x∗4 < x
∗
2, and the
group incentive compatibility constraint writes:
(x∗2 − x
∗
4)(x
∗
1 − x
∗
1) ≥ 0.
which is always satisfied. Hence the optimal contract satisfies the group incentive compatibility
constraint with transfers as soon as the planner knows the identity of the root.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology can
discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a simple
menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to maximize total welfare, and agents choose
among the menu. This mechanism is immune to deviations by single agents, and to deviations
by groups of agents of sizes 2, 3 and 4 if side-payments are ruled out. However, if compensations
are allowed, groups of agents may have an incentive to jointly deviate from the optimal contract
in order to exploit other agents. We identify network topologies for which the optimal contract
is group incentive compatible with transfers: undirected networks and regular oriented trees, and
network topologies for which the planner must assign uniform quantities: single root and nested
neighborhoods directed networks.
The analysis of this paper is a first step in the general study of the possible exploitation of
anonymized social data by third parties. However, we realize that the setting we consider is very
specific, and further research is needed to understand better how a planner can use partial knowledge
of the social network to target agents. In particular, we would like to study how a planner can use
simple instruments such as referral fees to extract information about agents’ local neighborhoods,
without any information about the network topology.
29
References
[1] Baris Ata, Alexandre Belloni, and Ozan Candogan. Latent agents in networks: Estimation
and pricing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.04878, 2018.
[2] Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calvo´-Armengol, and Yves Zenou. Who’s who in networks. wanted:
The key player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–1417, 2006.
[3] Francis Bloch et al. Targeting and pricing in social networks. The Oxford Handbook of the
Economics of Networks, pages 776–791, 2016.
[4] Francis Bloch and Nicolas Que´rou. Pricing in social networks. Games and economic behavior,
80:243–261, 2013.
[5] Phillip Bonacich. Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification.
Journal of mathematical sociology, 2(1):113–120, 1972.
[6] Ozan Candogan, Kostas Bimpikis, and Asuman Ozdaglar. Optimal pricing in networks with
externalities. Operations Research, 60(4):883–905, 2012.
[7] Jacques Cremer and Richard P McLean. Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and domi-
nant strategy auctions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1247–1257,
1988.
[8] Gabrielle Demange. Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities. Games
and Economic Behavior, 105:84–103, 2017.
[9] Itay P Fainmesser and Andrea Galeotti. Pricing network effects. The Review of Economic
Studies, 83(1):165–198, 2015.
[10] Andrea Galeotti, Benjamin Golub, and Sanjeev Goyal. Targeting interventions in networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.06026, 2017.
[11] Ali Jadbabaie and Ali Kakhbod. Optimal contracting in networks. Journal of Economic
Theory, 183:1094–1153, 2019.
[12] Leo Katz. A new status index derived from sociometric analysis. Psychometrika, 18(1):39–43,
1953.
[13] Fanqi Shi and Yiqing Xing. Screening with network externalities. Available at SSRN 3286427,
2018.
[14] Robert Wilson et al. Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy. Econometrica,
46(4):807–816, 1978.
30
A Proof of proposition 4
Fix a coalition S of adjacent players and consider the permutation ρ mapping i to ρ(i) for any
i ∈ S. (We dispense with the index S as the coalition is fixed). We first compute the difference of
utility of any player i in S when players in the coalition use the permutation and when they report
their true locations for any contract g, ,
∆Ui = a(xρ(i) − xi)−
(x2i − x
2
ρ(i))
2
+ α[
∑
j∈s
gij(xρ(i)xρ(j) − xixj) +
∑
j /∈s
gij(xρ(i) − xi)xj ],
= (xρ(i) − xi)[a−
(xi + xρ(i))
2
+ α
∑
j /∈S
gijxj ] + α
∑
j∈S
gij(xρ(i)xρ(j) − xixj).
At the optimal contract,
x∗i = a+ α
∑
j
[gij + gji]x
∗
j .
So
x∗i + x
∗
ρ(i) = 2a+ α
∑
j
([gij + gji]x
∗
j + [gρ(i)j + gjρ(i)]x
∗
j .
= 2a+ 2α
∑
j
[gij + gji]x
∗
j + α(
∑
j
[gρ(i)j + gjρ(i)]x
∗
j −
∑
j
([gij + gji]x
∗
j ))),
= 2a+ 2α
∑
j
[gij + gji]x
∗
j + (x
∗
ρ(i) − xi)
Replacing we obtain
∆Ui = α[(x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i )(−
∑
j /∈S
gjix
∗
j +
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )
2
)
+
∑
j∈S
(gij(x
∗
ρ(i)x
∗
ρ(j) − x
∗
i x
∗
j − x
∗
j (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i ))) − gjix
∗
j (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i ))]
= α[−
∑
j /∈S
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )gjix
∗
j −
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )
2
2
+
∑
j∈S
gijx
∗
ρ(i)(x
∗
ρ(j) − x
∗
j )−
∑
j∈S
gjix
∗
j (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i )].
Hence ∆Ui > 0 if and only if
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∑j∈S
gijx
∗
ρ(i)(x
∗
ρ(j) − xj)−
∑
j∈S
gjix
∗
j (x
∗
ρ(i) − x
∗
i ) >
∑
j /∈S
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )gjix
∗
j +
(x∗ρ(i) − x
∗
i )
2
2
. (8)
We now show that when |S| ≤ 4, there must be some agent for whom inequality (8) fails.
Suppose first that |S| = 2. Suppose without loss of generality that x∗2 > x
∗
1 and consider ∆U1.
Inequality (8) implies that
∆U1 = g12 + g21x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) > 0,
a contradiction as x∗2 > x
∗
1.
Suppose next that |S| = 3 and suppose without loss of generality that x∗1 < x
∗
2 < x
∗
3. Agent 1
must trade his quantity x∗1 for a higher quantity. Suppose first that ρ(1) = 3, ρ(3) = 2, ρ(2) = 1 so
that agent 1 is the only agent who trades his quantity x∗1 for a higher quantity. Then inequality (8)
yields
∆U1 = g12x
∗
3(x
∗
1 − x
∗
2) + g13x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
3)− x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1)− x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) > 0,
a contradiction as x∗3 > x
∗
2 > x
∗
1.
Suppose now that ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 3 and ρ(3) = 1. (This is the only other permutation to
consider, as any other permutation on S will leave one of the players at the same position.) Then
inequalities (8) for agents 1 and 2 result in
∆U1 = g12x
∗
2(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) + g13x
∗
2(x
∗
1 − x
∗
3)− g21x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1)− g31x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) > 0,
∆U2 = g21x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + g23x
∗
3(x
∗
1 − x
∗
3)− g12x
∗
1(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2)− g32x
∗
3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) > 0.
First notice that in both inequalities, the only positive term is the first term, which implies that
both g12 and g21 must be equal to 1 for the two inequalities to hold. Second, recall, that because
the coalition is connected g13 + g31 ≥ 1 and g23 + g32 ≥ 1. Now, as x
∗
2(x
∗
3 − x
∗
1) > x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1),
the first inequality is more likely to be satisfied when g13 = 0 and g31 = 1. Similarly, because
x∗3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
1) > x
∗
3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2), the second inequality is more likely to be satisfied when g23 = 0 and
g32=1. Hence if both inequalities are satisfied, we must have
x∗2(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) > x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1),
x∗3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) > x
∗
1(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) + x
∗
3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2)
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But this implies
x∗2(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) > x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + x
∗
3(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) > x
∗
2(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + x
∗
1(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) + x
∗
3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2) > x
∗
3(x
∗
3 − x
∗
2),
a contradiction that completes the proof for |S| = 3 .
Now suppose that the size of the group is |S| = 4 and suppose without loss of generality that
x∗4 > x
∗
3 > x
∗
2 > x
∗
1. There are six possible permutations where each member of the group gets
a different contract from the one intended for their location and no pair exchanges pairwise their
contracts. There are 36 possible ways in which the members of the group can be linked because
each link (gij , gji) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
Recall that :
∆Ui = −
α
2
(xρ(i) − xi)
2 − α(xρ(i) − xi)
∑
j∈S
gjixj
− α(xρ(i) − xi)
∑
j 6∈S
gjixj
+ αxρ(i)
∑
j∈S
gij(xρ(j) − xj)
1. Consider: ρ(1) = 4, ρ(2) = 1, ρ(3) = 2 and ρ(4) = 3
Note that all agents get a lower quantity except agent 1. The difference in utility of agent 1
writes:
∆U1 = −
α
2
(x∗4 − x
∗
1)
2 − α(x∗4 − x
∗
1)[g21x2 + g31x3 + g41x4]− α(x
∗
4 − x
∗
1)
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj
+ αxρ(1)[g12(x
∗
1 − x
∗
2) + g13(x
∗
2 − x
∗
3) + g14(x
∗
3 − x
∗
4)] < 0
Recall that x∗1 < x
∗
2 < x
∗
3 < x
∗
4, hence there exists at least one agent that is strictly worse
off with ρ for all network structures i.e. for all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and gij ∈ {0, 1} such that
gij + gji ≥ 1.
2. Consider: ρ(1) = 4, ρ(2) = 3, ρ(3) = 1 and ρ(4) = 2.
For all the network structures such that g12 = 0 and the remaining links take the value
0 or 1 such that for all i, j ∈ S gij + gji ≥ 1, ∆U1 < 0. Similarly, for g21 = 0, ∆U2 < 0.
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Moreover, when g12 = g21 = 1 and g13 = 1 and g31 ∈ {0, 1}: ∆U1 < 0. For g12 = g21 = 1
and g14 = 1 and g41 ∈ {0, 1}: ∆U1 < 0. The remaining networks that we need inspect are
networks such that g12 = g21 = 1 and g13 = 0, g31 = 1, g14 = 0, g41 = 1. But again, when
g31 = 1 and the remaining links take values 0 or 1 such that for i, j ∈ S, gij + gji ≥ 1, we get
∆U1 < 0.
3. Consider: ρ(1) = 3, ρ(2) = 4, ρ(3) = 2 and ρ(4) = 1.
For all the network structures such that g12 = 0 and the remaining links take the value
0 or 1 such that for all i, j ∈ S gij + gji ≥ 1, ∆U1 < 0. Similarly, when g21 = 0, ∆U2 < 0.
Hence we check structures where g12 = g21 = 1.
For g12 = g21 = 1 and g24 = 1 and g42 ∈ {0, 1}: ∆U2 < 0. Similarly, when g12 = g21 = 1 and
g14 = 1 and g41 ∈ {0, 1}: ∆U1 < 0.
The remaining networks that we need to inspect are such that g12 = g21 = 1 and g14 = 0,
g41 = 1, g24 = 0, g42 = 1 and the remaining links take the value 0 or 1, and for all i, j ∈ S
gij + gji ≥ 1. Consider ∆U2 :
∆U2 = −
α
2
(x∗4 − x
∗
2)
2 − α(x∗4 − x
∗
2)
∑
j 6∈S
gj2xj − α(x
∗
4 − x
∗
2)(x
∗
1 + g32x
∗
3 + x
∗
4)
+ αx∗4((x
∗
3 − x
∗
1) + g23(x
∗
2 − x
∗
3)))
If (x∗3 − x
∗
1) < (x
∗
4 − x
∗
2) then ∆U2 < 0. If not, consider ∆U1:
∆U1 = −
α
2
(x∗3 − x
∗
1)
2 − α(x∗3 − x
∗
1)
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj − α(x
∗
3 − x
∗
1)(x
∗
2 + g31x
∗
3 + x
∗
4)
+ αx∗3((x
∗
4 − x
∗
2) + g13(x
∗
2 − x
∗
3)))
If (x∗3 − x
∗
1) ≥ (x
∗
4 − x
∗
2) then ∆U1 < 0. A contradiction which completes the proof for this
permutation ρ.
4. Consider: ρ(1) = 3, ρ(2) = 1, ρ(3) = 4 and ρ(4) = 2.
For all the network structures such that g31 = 0 and the remaining links take the value
0 or 1 such that for all i, j ∈ S gij + gji ≥ 1, ∆U3 < 0. Similarly, when g13 = 0, ∆U1 < 0.
Moreover for g13 = g31 = 1 and g14 = 1 and g41 ∈ {0, 1} , it follows that ∆U1 < 0.
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The remaining networks to inspect are ones where g13 = g31 = 1 and g14 = 0 and g41 = 1.
Let d1 = x
∗
3 − x
∗
1 and d2 = x
∗
4 − x
∗
3. The variation in payoffs of agents 1 and 3 writes:
∆U1 =− αd1[
d1
2
+ (g21x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 + x
∗
4) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ]− αx
∗
3g12(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + αd2x
∗
3
∆U3 =− αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1 + g43x
∗
4) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ]− αx
∗
4[g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + g34(x
∗
4 − x
∗
2)] + αd1x
∗
4
If d1 ≥ d2 then ∆U1 < 0 because the positive term αd2x∗3 is strictly smaller than −αd1x
∗
4.
We study below the remaining case: d2 > d1. Suppose by contradiction that ∆U3 > 0 and
recall that g34 + g43 ≥ 1 because players 3 and 4 are part of the same group S. For g43 = 1
and g34 ∈ {0, 1}:
∆U3 > 0⇔ αd1x
∗
4 > αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1 + x
∗
4) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4[g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + g34(x
∗
4 − x
∗
2)](> 0)
⇔ αx∗4(d1 − d2) > αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4[g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + g34(x
∗
4 − x
∗
2)](> 0)
A contradiction because αx∗4(d1 − d2) < 0. Hence ∆U3 < 0. Recall that αd1x
∗
4 is upper
bounded by αd2x
∗
4 because we are considering the case d2 > d1. For g34 = 1 and g43 ∈ {0, 1}:
αd2x
∗
4 > (αd1x
∗
4 >)αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1 + g43x
∗
4) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4[g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1) + (x
∗
4 − x
∗
2)](> 0)
⇔αd2x
∗
4 − αx
∗
4(x
∗
4 − x
∗
2) > αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1)(> 0)
⇔αx∗4(x
∗
4 − x
∗
3 − x
∗
4 + x
∗
2) > αd2[
d2
2
+ (g23x
∗
2 + x
∗
1) +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4g32(x
∗
2 − x
∗
1)(> 0)
A contradiction because x∗1 < x
∗
2 < x
∗
3 < x
∗
4 implies αx
∗
4(x
∗
4−x
∗
3−x
∗
4+x
∗
2) < 0 and the RHS
is strictly positive. Hence ∆U3 < 0, which completes the proof for this permutation.
5. Consider: ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 4, ρ(3) = 1 and ρ(4) = 3.
For all the network structures such that g21 = 0 (link with the other agent who gets a higher
quantity) and the remaining links take the value 0 or 1 such that for all i, j ∈ S gij + gji ≥ 1,
∆U2 < 0. Similarly, for g12 = 0, ∆U1 < 0. Moreover, for g12 = g21 = 1 and g23 = 1 and
g32 ∈ {0, 1}: ∆U2 < 0. We inspect the remaining group structures for which we did not show
a contradiction: g12 = g21 = 1 and g23 = 0 and g32 = 1. Following the same reasoning in the
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previous case, let d3 = x
∗
2− x
∗
1 and d4 = x
∗
4 −x
∗
2. If d3 ≥ d4 = then ∆U1 < 0. If d4 > d3 then
∆U3 < 0 (consider the links g42 + g24 ≥ 1).
6. Consider: ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 3, ρ(3) = 4 and ρ(4) = 1
Let d1 = x
∗
2 − x
∗
1, d2 = x
∗
3 − x
∗
2, d3 = x
∗
4 − x
∗
3 and d4 = x
∗
4 − x
∗
1 (clearly d4 = d1 + d2 + d3).
The variation in payoffs of agents 1, 2, 3 write:
∆U1 = −αd1[
d1
2
+ g21x
∗
2 + g31x
∗
3 + g41x
∗
4 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ] + αx
∗
2[g12d2 + g13d3 − g14d4]
If g14 = 1, g12 ∈ {0, 1} and g13 ∈ {0, 1} then ∆U1 < 0 because d4 > d2 + d3. If g12 = g13 = 0
and g14 ∈ {0, 1} then ∆U1 < 0. Hence we consider networks where g14 = 0 and g12+ g13 ≥ 1.
∆U2 = −αd2[
d2
2
+ g12x
∗
1 + g32x
∗
3 + g42x
∗
4 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj2xj ] + αx
∗
3[g21d1 + g23d3 − g24d4]
If g24 = 1, g21 ∈ {0, 1} and g23 ∈ {0, 1} then ∆U2 < 0. If g21 = g23 = 0 and g24 ∈ {0, 1} then
∆U2 < 0. Hence we consider networks where g24 = 0 and g21 + g23 ≥ 1.
∆U3 = −αd3[
d3
2
+ g13x
∗
1 + g23x
∗
2 + g43x
∗
4 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ] + αx
∗
4[g31d1 + g32d2 − g34d4]
If g34 = 1, g31 ∈ {0, 1} and g32 ∈ {0, 1} then ∆U3 < 0. If g31 = g32 = 0 and g34 ∈ {0, 1} then
∆U3 < 0. Hence we consider networks where g34 = 0 and g31 + g32 ≥ 1.
Now we consider the remaining group structures such that: g14 = g24 = g34 = 0 (and
g41 = g42 = g43 = 1), g12 + g13 ≥ 1, g21 + g23 ≥ 1 and g31 + g32 ≥ 1. In addition to the
three previous inequalities, gij + gji ≥ 1 for i 6= j ∈ S. This leaves us with exactly 10 group
structures to inspect. The variation in payoffs rewrite:
∆U1 = −αd1[
d1
2
+ g21x
∗
2 + g31x
∗
3 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ]− αd1x
∗
4 + αx
∗
2[g12d2 + g13d3]
∆U2 = −αd2[
d2
2
+ g12x
∗
1 + g32x
∗
3 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj2xj ]− αd2x
∗
4 + αx
∗
3[g21d1 + g23d3]
∆U3 = −αd3[
d3
2
+ g13x
∗
1 + g23x
∗
2 +
∑
j 6∈S
gj3xj ]− αd3x
∗
4 + αx
∗
4[g31d1 + g32d2]
(a) g12 = g31 = g23 = 1 and g13 = g32 = g21 = 0: if d3 > d1 then ∆U3 < 0. If d3 < d1 and
d2 > d3 then ∆U2 < 0. If d3 < d1 and d3 > d2 then it implies d1 > d2 and ∆U1 < 0.
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(b) g12 = g31 = g23 = 0 and g13 = g32 = g21 = 1: if d3 > d2 then ∆U3 < 0. If d2 < d3 and
d2 > d1, ∆U2 < 0. If d2 > d3 and d1 > d2 then it implies d1 > d3, ∆U1 < 0.
(c) g12 = g31 = g32 = g23 = g21 = 1 and g13 = 0: if d1 > d2, ∆U1 < 0. If d2 > d1, ∆U2 < 0.
(d) g13 = g31 = g23 = g21 = 1 and g12 = g32 = 0: if d1 > d3, ∆U1 < 0. If d3 > d1, ∆U3 < 0.
(e) g12 = g13 = g32 = g23 = 1 and g31 = g21 = 0: if d2 > d3, ∆U2 < 0. If d3 > d2, ∆U3 < 0.
(f) g12 = g13 = g32 = g23 = g21 = 1 and g31 = 0: if d1 > d2 and d1 > d3 then ∆U1 < 0. If
d1 > d2 and d3 > d1 then it implies d3 > d2 and ∆U3 < 0. If d2 > d1 and d1 > d3 then
it implies d2 > d3 and ∆U2 < 0. If d2 > d1 and d3 > d1 then ∆U3 < 0.
(g) g12 = g13 = g31 = g32 = g21 = 1 and g23 = 0. If d2 > d1 then ∆U2 < 0. If d1 > d2 and
d1 > d3 then ∆U3 < 0. If d1 > d2 and d3 > d1, it implies d3 > d1 > d2. If d3 > d1 > d2
and d3 > d1 + d2 then ∆U3 < 0. Last case: d3 > d1 > d2 and d3 < d1 + d2. We rewrite
∆U1 and find a (negative) upper bound using d3 < d1 + d2 ⇔ d3 − d1 < d2:
∆U1 = −αd1(
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj)− αd1x
∗
3 + αd2x
∗
2 − αd1x
∗
4 + αx
∗
2(d3 − d1)
< −αd1(
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj)− αd1x
∗
3 + αd2x
∗
2 − αd1x
∗
4 + αx
∗
2d2
< 0 because d1 > d2
(h) g12 = g13 = g23 = g32 = g21 = 1 and g31 = 0. If d1 > d2 and d1 > d3 then ∆U1 < 0. If
d1 > d2 and d3 > d1 then d3 > d2 and ∆U3 < 0. If d2 > d1 and d1 > d3 then d2 > d3
and ∆U2 < 0. Last two cases: if d2 > d1 and d3 > d1 and d2 > d3. We rewrite ∆U2:
∆U2 = −αd2(
d2
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj2xj)− d2x
∗
1 − x
∗
3(d2 − d3)− d2x
∗
4 + d1x
∗
3 < 0
If d2 > d1 and d3 > d1 and d3 > d2, then ∆U3 < 0 (because here g32 = 0).
(i) g31 = g12 = g21 = g23 = 1 and g32 = g13 = 0. If d3 > d1 then ∆U3 < 0. If d1 > d3 and
d1 > d2 then ∆U1 < 0. Last two cases: if d2 > d1 > d3 and d2 > d1 + d3 then ∆U2 < 0.
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If d2 > d1 > d3 and d2 < d1 + d3, we rewrite ∆U1:
∆U1 = −αd1[
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ]− αd1(x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 + x
∗
4) + αd2x
∗
2
< −αd1[
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ]− αd1(x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 + x
∗
2) + αd2x
∗
2( because − x
∗
4 < −x
∗
2)
= −αd1[
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj ]− αd1x
∗
3 − 2αd1x
∗
2 + αx
∗
2d2
< 0 because (d2 < d1 + d3 < 2d1)
(j) g31 = g13 = g32 = g23 = g21 = 1 and g12 = 0. If d1 > d3 then ∆U1 < 0. If d3 > d1 and
d2 > d3 then ∆U2 < 0. Last two cases: if d3 > d2 > d1 and d3 > d1 + d2 then ∆U3 < 0.
If d3 > d1 > d2 and d3 < d1 + d2, we rewrite ∆U1:
∆U1 = −αd1(
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj)− αd1(x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 + x
∗
4) + αd3x
∗
2
< −αd1(
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj)− αd1(x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 + x
∗
2) + αd3x
∗
2 because − x
∗
4 < −x
∗
2
= −αd1(
d1
2
+
∑
j 6∈S
gj1xj)− αd1x
∗
3 − 2αd1x
∗
2 + αd3x
∗
2
< 0 because d3 < d1 + d2 < 2d1
a contradiction that completes the proof of the Proposition. .
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